Divine command theory (DCT) is the view that what is right is what God commands, and what is wrong is what God forbids. In other words, morality is ultimately derived from the will of God.
The Euthyphro dilemma is a philosophical problem that poses a challenge to DCT. The dilemma is posed in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, “Is something pious because the gods approve of it, or do the gods approve of it because it is pious?”
There are two horns to the dilemma. The first horn is that an act is pious because the gods approve of it. This horn leads to the problem of arbitrariness. If what is pious is simply whatever the gods approve of, then there is no objective standard of morality. Morality would be arbitrary, and there would be no way to say that one act is more pious than another.
The second horn is that the gods approve of an act because it is pious. This horn leads to the problem of circularity. If the gods approve of an act because it is pious, then we are simply saying that the gods approve of what they approve of. This is not a very helpful explanation of morality, as it does not tell us anything about why the gods approve of certain acts.
Wallis argues that the Euthyphro dilemma applies to all attempts to ground moral authority in the dictates of an authority. This is because any attempt to ground morality in the commands of an authority will ultimately lead to one of the two horns of the dilemma. Either the authority’s commands are arbitrary, or they are circular.
For example, consider the following attempt to ground moral authority in the dictates of the state. We might say that an act is right because the state commands it. However, this leads to the problem of arbitrariness. If what is right is simply whatever the state commands, then there is no objective standard of morality. Morality would be arbitrary, and there would be no way to say that one act is more right than another.
Alternatively, we might say that the state commands an act because it is right. However, this leads to the problem of circularity. If the state commands an act because it is right, then we are simply saying that the state commands what it commands. This is not a very helpful explanation of morality, as it does not tell us anything about why the state commands certain acts.
In conclusion, the Euthyphro dilemma is a serious challenge to any attempt to ground moral authority in the dictates of an authority. The dilemma shows that either the authority’s commands are arbitrary, or they are circular. This means that any attempt to ground morality in the commands of an authority will ultimately fail.
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