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Consider the following set of propositions: (1) “Linda remembers receiving an autograph from Muhammad Ali.” (2) “Linda does not remember receiving an autograph from Cassius Clay.” • Do these propositions contain any reference to propositional attitudes? If so, which? • Do these propositions attribute any properties to objects? If so, which objects? • What conclusion, if any, can you derive from these two propositions? (Does it follow that Muhammad Ali and Cassius Clay are different people?
6. Descartes says that he can conceive of himself being a disembodied spirit (that is, having a mind but not a body). What does conceiving of something mean? Does Descartes’ claim entail that it is possible for him to be a disembodied spirit? (See discussion of conceivability and possibility in Chapter 8.)
7. Is a statue identical with the stone it is made of? Is an organism identical with the collection of cells in its body? Can Leibniz’s Law be used to show that either of these claims of identity is false?
8. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues that he is essentially a thinking thing. An essential property of a thing is a property that the thing must have if it is to exist. Could Descartes be deprived of thought and still be Descartes? Could Descartes have been born without the capacity of thought and still be Descartes? If Descartes can’t doubt that he thinks, is that enough to show that Descartes is essentially a thinking thing?
9. It was suggested in this chapter that we understand causality best when there is a physical signal that passes from cause to effect (the electricity example). However, the fact that “absences” sometimes cause suggests that causality need not involve a physical signal. For example, suppose a patient dies because his doctor fails to give him medicine. There is no “physical signal” between the doctor and patient in this case, but there is causation. Does this point solve the objection to dualism that concerns the nature of causality?
10. Would the discovery of perfect correlations between certain mental events and physical events (say, between experiences of pain and c-fiber firings) be evidence against dualism? Why or why not?
11. What are the two central arguments that advocates of the Mind/Brain Identity thesis typically appeal to when defending their position?
12. Why might someone doubt that the Principle of Uniformity is a surefire guide to which theories we should pursue? Do you think this skepticism is well-founded, or is it just another example of philosophers’ penchant for “radical doubt”?
13. Suppose we observe a perfect correlation between some mental property (like feeling pain) and some physical property (like having one’s c-fibers fire). Apply the Surprise Principle (Chapter 3) to see whether this observation strongly favors the identity theory over dualism.
14.In the passage from Principles of Natural Philosophy quoted in this chapter, Newton defends the Principle of Parsimony by saying that “Nature does nothing in vain.” Is this idea consistent with what we now know about natural selection (Chapter 6)?
