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Compare and contrast skeptical invariantism as defended in Peter Unger’s “A Defense of Skepticism” and Keith DeRose’s “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.”
Sample Answer
Understanding Skeptical Invariantism: A Comparison of Unger’s and DeRose’s Perspectives
Introduction:
Skeptical invariantism is a philosophical position that addresses the challenge of skepticism regarding knowledge claims. Peter Unger’s “A Defense of Skepticism” and Keith DeRose’s “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” both contribute to the understanding of skeptical invariantism. In this essay, we will compare and contrast their perspectives on skepticism, focusing on their arguments, approaches to contextualism, and implications for knowledge attribution.
Comparison:
Skeptical Challenge:
Both Unger and DeRose acknowledge the skeptical challenge posed to knowledge claims. Unger presents a radical skeptical position, arguing that we cannot have knowledge of even the most mundane beliefs due to the possibility of radical deception. On the other hand, DeRose acknowledges the challenge but seeks to provide a more nuanced response by incorporating contextual factors that influence knowledge attributions.
Approach to Contextualism:
DeRose’s contextualism is a key distinction from Unger’s perspective. DeRose argues that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions are context-sensitive, meaning that the standards for knowledge can vary depending on the context of the conversation. He suggests that this contextual variability allows us to maintain knowledge claims in everyday situations while acknowledging the possibility of skepticism in certain contexts. Unger, however, does not engage with contextualism directly and instead focuses on the radical skeptical position.
Implications for Knowledge Attribution:
Unger’s defense of skepticism leads to a more pessimistic view regarding knowledge attribution. He argues that our ordinary knowledge claims are highly uncertain due to the possibility of radical deception. Unger contends that we lack the necessary evidence to support our everyday beliefs, undermining our confidence in knowledge claims. In contrast, DeRose’s contextualism allows for a more optimistic view of knowledge attribution. By recognizing that knowledge standards can vary depending on context, DeRose asserts that we can still attribute knowledge in ordinary situations while acknowledging that skepticism may be applicable in certain contexts.
Contrast:
Scope of Skepticism:
Unger’s defense of skepticism takes a more radical stance compared to DeRose’s contextualism. Unger argues for universal skepticism, claiming that we cannot have knowledge of even the most basic beliefs. In contrast, DeRose’s contextualism allows for a more limited scope of skepticism. While he acknowledges the possibility of skepticism in specific contexts, he maintains that we can still have knowledge in everyday situations.
Treatment of Context:
DeRose’s contextualism places significant importance on context when determining knowledge attributions. He argues that the standards for knowledge can vary depending on factors such as conversational context and epistemic standards within a particular community. Unger, however, does not engage with contextual considerations explicitly in his defense of skepticism.
Epistemic Implications:
Unger’s defense of skepticism raises profound epistemic concerns, challenging our ability to have justified beliefs and undermining our confidence in knowledge claims. His argument highlights the limitations of human understanding and the potential for radical deception. In contrast, DeRose’s contextualism offers a more nuanced approach, allowing for the attribution of knowledge in everyday situations while acknowledging the possibility of skepticism in specific contexts.
Conclusion:
While both Unger’s “A Defense of Skepticism” and DeRose’s “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” contribute to our understanding of skeptical invariantism, they differ in their approaches and implications. Unger presents a radical skeptical position that questions our ability to have knowledge in any domain, while DeRose’s contextualism allows for the attribution of knowledge in everyday situations while acknowledging the possibility of skepticism in certain contexts. These differing perspectives provide valuable insights into the challenges posed by skepticism and offer alternative approaches to understanding our epistemic limitations and the nature of knowledge attribution.
